Make sure we specify the layout segment range when calculating the
mirror count. In theory, that number could depend on the range to
which we're writing.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

Both nfs_pageio_reset_read_mds() and nfs_pageio_reset_write_mds()
do call pnfs_generic_pg_cleanup() for us.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

If the application uses the AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC flag after doing readdir(),
then we should still mark the parent inode as seeing a readdirplus hit.
That ensures that we continue to use readdirplus in the 'ls -l' type
of workflow to do fast lookups of the dentries.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>

59960b9d ("io_uring: fix lazy work init") tried to fix missing
io_req_init_async(), but left out work.flags and hash. Do it earlier.

Fixes: 7cdaf587 ("io_uring: avoid whole io_wq_work copy for requests completed inline")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Ensure to set msg.msg_name for the async portion of send/recvmsg,
as the header copy will copy to/from it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We currently account the memory after the exit work has been run, but
that leaves a gap where a process has closed its ring and until the
memory has been accounted as freed. If the memlocked ulimit is
borderline, then that can introduce spurious setup errors returning
-ENOMEM because the free work hasn't been run yet.

Account this as freed when we close the ring, as not to expose a tiny
gap where setting up a new ring can fail.

Fixes: 85faa7b8 ("io_uring: punt final io_ring_ctx wait-and-free to workqueue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

I got a memleak report when doing some fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0x607eeac06e78 (size 8):
  comm "test", pid 295, jiffies 4294735835 (age 31.745s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00                          ........
  backtrace:
    [<00000000932632e6>] percpu_ref_init+0x2a/0x1b0
    [<0000000092ddb796>] __io_uring_register+0x111d/0x22a0
    [<00000000eadd6c77>] __x64_sys_io_uring_register+0x17b/0x480
    [<00000000591b89a6>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
    [<00000000864a281d>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Call percpu_ref_exit() on error path to avoid
refcount memleak.

Fixes: 05f3fb3c ("io_uring: avoid ring quiesce for fixed file set unregister and update")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

btrfs implements the iter_write op and thus can use the more efficient
iov_iter based splice implementation.  For now falling back to the less
efficient default is pretty harmless, but I have a pending series that
removes the default, and thus would cause btrfs to not support splice
at all.

Reported-by: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

While debugging a patch that I wrote I was hitting use-after-free panics
when accessing block groups on unmount.  This turned out to be because
in the nocow case if we bail out of doing the nocow for whatever reason
we need to call btrfs_dec_nocow_writers() if we called the inc.  This
puts our block group, but a few error cases does

if (nocow) {
    btrfs_dec_nocow_writers();
    goto error;
}

unfortunately, error is

error:
	if (nocow)
		btrfs_dec_nocow_writers();

so we get a double put on our block group.  Fix this by dropping the
error cases calling of btrfs_dec_nocow_writers(), as it's handled at the
error label now.

Fixes: 762bf098 ("btrfs: improve error handling in run_delalloc_nocow")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

        To 2.28

Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

Don't leak a reference to tlink during the NOTIFY ioctl

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+

I got a memleak report when doing some fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888113e02300 (size 488):
comm "syz-executor401", pid 356, jiffies 4294809529 (age 11.954s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
a0 a4 ce 19 81 88 ff ff 60 ce 09 0d 81 88 ff ff ........`.......
backtrace:
[<00000000129a84ec>] kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:659 [inline]
[<00000000129a84ec>] __alloc_file+0x25/0x310 fs/file_table.c:101
[<000000003050ad84>] alloc_empty_file+0x4f/0x120 fs/file_table.c:151
[<000000004d0a41a3>] alloc_file+0x5e/0x550 fs/file_table.c:193
[<000000002cb242f0>] alloc_file_pseudo+0x16a/0x240 fs/file_table.c:233
[<00000000046a4baa>] anon_inode_getfile fs/anon_inodes.c:91 [inline]
[<00000000046a4baa>] anon_inode_getfile+0xac/0x1c0 fs/anon_inodes.c:74
[<0000000035beb745>] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xd4a/0x2680 kernel/events/core.c:11720
[<0000000049009dc7>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359
[<00000000353731ca>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881152dd5e0 (size 16):
comm "syz-executor401", pid 356, jiffies 4294809529 (age 11.954s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<0000000074caa794>] kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:659 [inline]
[<0000000074caa794>] lsm_file_alloc security/security.c:567 [inline]
[<0000000074caa794>] security_file_alloc+0x32/0x160 security/security.c:1440
[<00000000c6745ea3>] __alloc_file+0xba/0x310 fs/file_table.c:106
[<000000003050ad84>] alloc_empty_file+0x4f/0x120 fs/file_table.c:151
[<000000004d0a41a3>] alloc_file+0x5e/0x550 fs/file_table.c:193
[<000000002cb242f0>] alloc_file_pseudo+0x16a/0x240 fs/file_table.c:233
[<00000000046a4baa>] anon_inode_getfile fs/anon_inodes.c:91 [inline]
[<00000000046a4baa>] anon_inode_getfile+0xac/0x1c0 fs/anon_inodes.c:74
[<0000000035beb745>] __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xd4a/0x2680 kernel/events/core.c:11720
[<0000000049009dc7>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:359
[<00000000353731ca>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

If io_sqe_file_register() failed, we need put the file that get by fget()
to avoid the memleak.

Fixes: c3a31e60 ("io_uring: add support for IORING_REGISTER_FILES_UPDATE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

For those applications which are not willing to use io_uring_enter()
to reap and handle cqes, they may completely rely on liburing's
io_uring_peek_cqe(), but if cq ring has overflowed, currently because
io_uring_peek_cqe() is not aware of this overflow, it won't enter
kernel to flush cqes, below test program can reveal this bug:

static void test_cq_overflow(struct io_uring *ring)
{
        struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
        struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
        int issued = 0;
        int ret = 0;

        do {
                sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(ring);
                if (!sqe) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "get sqe failed\n");
                        break;;
                }
                ret = io_uring_submit(ring);
                if (ret <= 0) {
                        if (ret != -EBUSY)
                                fprintf(stderr, "sqe submit failed: %d\n", ret);
                        break;
                }
                issued++;
        } while (ret > 0);
        assert(ret == -EBUSY);

        printf("issued requests: %d\n", issued);

        while (issued) {
                ret = io_uring_peek_cqe(ring, &cqe);
                if (ret) {
                        if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
                                fprintf(stderr, "peek completion failed: %s\n",
                                        strerror(ret));
                                break;
                        }
                        printf("left requets: %d\n", issued);
                        continue;
                }
                io_uring_cqe_seen(ring, cqe);
                issued--;
                printf("left requets: %d\n", issued);
        }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
        int ret;
        struct io_uring ring;

        ret = io_uring_queue_init(16, &ring, 0);
        if (ret) {
                fprintf(stderr, "ring setup failed: %d\n", ret);
                return 1;
        }

        test_cq_overflow(&ring);
        return 0;
}

To fix this issue, export cq overflow status to userspace by adding new
IORING_SQ_CQ_OVERFLOW flag, then helper functions() in liburing, such as
io_uring_peek_cqe, can be aware of this cq overflow and do flush accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Xiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We should not be logging a warning repeatedly on change notify.

CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

Fold it into the two callers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Consolidate the two in-kernel read helpers to make upcoming changes
easier.  The only difference are the missing call to rw_verify_area
in kernel_read, and an access_ok check that doesn't make sense for
kernel buffers to start with.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

This is the counterpart to __kernel_write, and skip the rw_verify_area
call compared to kernel_read.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Fold it into the two callers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Consolidate the two in-kernel write helpers to make upcoming changes
easier.  The only difference are the missing call to rw_verify_area
in kernel_write, and an access_ok check that doesn't make sense for
kernel buffers to start with.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

Add a WARN_ON_ONCE if the file isn't actually open for write.  This
matches the check done in vfs_write, but actually warn warns as a
kernel user calling write on a file not opened for writing is a pretty
obvious programming error.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

This is a very special interface that skips sb_writes protection, and not
used by modules anymore.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>

While pipes don't really need sb_writers projection, __kernel_write is an
interface better kept private, and the additional rw_verify_area does not
hurt here.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>

__kernel_write doesn't take a sb_writers references, which we need here.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

The caller of cifs_posix_lock_set will do retry(like
fcntl_setlk64->do_lock_file_wait) if we will wait for any file_lock.
So the retry in cifs_poxis_lock_set seems duplicated, remove it to
make a cleanup.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>

read permission, not just read attributes permission, is required
on the directory.

See MS-SMB2 (protocol specification) section 3.3.5.19.

Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>

So far, gfs2 has taken the inode glocks inside the ->readpage and
->readahead address space operations.  Since commit d4388340 ("fs:
convert mpage_readpages to mpage_readahead"), gfs2_readahead is passed
the pages to read ahead locked.  With that, the current holder of the
inode glock may be trying to lock one of those pages while
gfs2_readahead is trying to take the inode glock, resulting in a
deadlock.

Fix that by moving the lock taking to the higher-level ->read_iter file
and ->fault vm operations.  This also gets rid of an ugly lock inversion
workaround in gfs2_readpage.

The cache consistency model of filesystems like gfs2 is such that if
data is found in the page cache, the data is up to date and can be used
without taking any filesystem locks.  If a page is not cached,
filesystem locks must be taken before populating the page cache.

To avoid taking the inode glock when the data is already cached,
gfs2_file_read_iter first tries to read the data with the IOCB_NOIO flag
set.  If that fails, the inode glock is taken and the operation is
retried with the IOCB_NOIO flag cleared.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>

[BUG]
The following small test script can trigger ASSERT() at unmount time:

  mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
  mount $dev $mnt
  mount -o remount,discard=async $mnt
  umount $mnt

The call trace:
  assertion failed: atomic_read(&block_group->count) == 1, in fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3431
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3204!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 4 PID: 10389 Comm: umount Tainted: G           O      5.8.0-rc3-custom+ #68
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   btrfs_free_block_groups.cold+0x22/0x55 [btrfs]
   close_ctree+0x2cb/0x323 [btrfs]
   btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x17 [btrfs]
   generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110
   kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30
   btrfs_kill_super+0x17/0x30 [btrfs]
   deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0xa0
   deactivate_super+0x40/0x50
   cleanup_mnt+0x135/0x190
   __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
   task_work_run+0x64/0xb0
   __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bc/0x1c0
   __syscall_return_slowpath+0x47/0x230
   do_syscall_64+0x64/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The code:
                ASSERT(atomic_read(&block_group->count) == 1);
                btrfs_put_block_group(block_group);

[CAUSE]
Obviously it's some btrfs_get_block_group() call doesn't get its put
call.

The offending btrfs_get_block_group() happens here:

  void btrfs_mark_bg_unused(struct btrfs_block_group *bg)
  {
  	if (list_empty(&bg->bg_list)) {
  		btrfs_get_block_group(bg);
		list_add_tail(&bg->bg_list, &fs_info->unused_bgs);
  	}
  }

So every call sites removing the block group from unused_bgs list should
reduce the ref count of that block group.

However for async discard, it didn't follow the call convention:

  void btrfs_discard_punt_unused_bgs_list(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
  {
  	list_for_each_entry_safe(block_group, next, &fs_info->unused_bgs,
  				 bg_list) {
  		list_del_init(&block_group->bg_list);
  		btrfs_discard_queue_work(&fs_info->discard_ctl, block_group);
  	}
  }

And in btrfs_discard_queue_work(), it doesn't call
btrfs_put_block_group() either.

[FIX]
Fix the problem by reducing the reference count when we grab the block
group from unused_bgs list.

Reported-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Fixes: 6e80d4f8 ("btrfs: handle empty block_group removal for async discard")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6+
Tested-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

When switching to TWA_SIGNAL for task_work notifications, we also made
any signal based condition in io_cqring_wait() return -ERESTARTSYS.
This breaks applications that rely on using signals to abort someone
waiting for events.

Check if we have a signal pending because of queued task_work, and
repeat the signal check once we've run the task_work. This provides a
reliable way of telling the two apart.

Additionally, only use TWA_SIGNAL if we are using an eventfd. If not,
we don't have the dependency situation described in the original commit,
and we can get by with just using TWA_RESUME like we previously did.

Fixes: ce593a6c ("io_uring: use signal based task_work running")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Tested-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This error path returned directly instead of calling sysctl_head_finish().

Fixes: ef9d965b ("sysctl: reject gigantic reads/write to sysctl files")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Before this patch, some gfs2 code locked the freeze glock with LM_FLAG_NOEXP
(Do not freeze) flag, and some did not. We never want to freeze the freeze
glock, so this patch makes it consistently use LM_FLAG_NOEXP always.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>

Before this patch, the freeze code in gfs2 specified GL_NOCACHE in
several places. That's wrong because we always want to know the state
of whether the file system is frozen.

There was also a problem with freeze/thaw transitioning the glock from
frozen (EX) to thawed (SH) because gfs2 will normally grant glocks in EX
to processes that request it in SH mode, unless GL_EXACT is specified.
Therefore, the freeze/thaw code, which tried to reacquire the glock in
SH mode would get the glock in EX mode, and miss the transition from EX
to SH. That made it think the thaw had completed normally, but since the
glock was still cached in EX, other nodes could not freeze again.

This patch removes the GL_NOCACHE flag to allow the freeze glock to be
cached. It also adds the GL_EXACT flag so the glock is fully transitioned
from EX to SH, thereby allowing future freeze operations.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>

Before this patch, only read-write mounts would grab the freeze
glock in read-only mode, as part of gfs2_make_fs_rw. So the freeze
glock was never initialized. That meant requests to freeze, which
request the glock in EX, were granted without any state transition.
That meant you could mount a gfs2 file system, which is currently
frozen on a different cluster node, in read-only mode.

This patch makes read-only mounts lock the freeze glock in SH mode,
which will block for file systems that are frozen on another node.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>

Before this patch, function freeze_go_sync, called when promoting
the freeze glock, was testing for the SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE superblock flag.
That's only set for read-write mounts. Read-only mounts don't use a
journal, so the bit is never set, so the freeze never happened.

This patch removes the check for SDF_JOURNAL_LIVE for freeze requests
but still checks it when deciding whether to flush a journal.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>

In several places, we used the GIF_ORDERED inode flag to determine
if an inode was on the ordered writes list. However, since we always
held the sd_ordered_lock spin_lock during the manipulation, we can
just as easily check list_empty(&ip->i_ordered) instead.
This allows us to keep more than one ordered writes list to make
journal writing improvements.

This patch eliminates GIF_ORDERED in favor of checking list_empty.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>

Eric reported an issue where mounting -o recovery with a fuzzed fs
resulted in a kernel panic.  This is because we tried to free the tree
node, except it was an error from the read.  Fix this by properly
resetting the tree_root->node == NULL in this case.  The panic was the
following

  BTRFS warning (device loop0): failed to read tree root
  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001f
  RIP: 0010:free_extent_buffer+0xe/0x90 [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   free_root_extent_buffers.part.0+0x11/0x30 [btrfs]
   free_root_pointers+0x1a/0xa2 [btrfs]
   open_ctree+0x1776/0x18a5 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs]
   ? selinux_fs_context_parse_param+0x37/0x80
   legacy_get_tree+0x27/0x40
   vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0
   fc_mount+0xe/0x30
   vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90
   btrfs_mount+0x147/0x3e0 [btrfs]
   ? cred_has_capability+0x7c/0x120
   ? legacy_get_tree+0x27/0x40
   legacy_get_tree+0x27/0x40
   vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0
   do_mount+0x735/0xa40
   __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Nik says: this is problematic only if we fail on the last iteration of
the loop as this results in init_tree_roots returning err value with
tree_root->node = -ERR. Subsequently the caller does: fail_tree_roots
which calls free_root_pointers on the bogus value.

Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Fixes: b8522a1e ("btrfs: Factor out tree roots initialization during mount")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add details how the pointer gets dereferenced ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Commit 7f9fe614 ("btrfs: improve global reserve stealing logic"),
added in the 5.8 merge window, introduced another leak for the space_info's
reclaim_size counter. This is very often triggered by the test cases
generic/269 and generic/416 from fstests, producing a stack trace like the
following during unmount:

[37079.155499] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37079.156844] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2000423 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3422 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2eb/0x300 [btrfs]
[37079.158090] Modules linked in: dm_snapshot btrfs dm_thin_pool (...)
[37079.164440] CPU: 2 PID: 2000423 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W         5.7.0-rc7-btrfs-next-62 #1
[37079.165422] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), (...)
[37079.167384] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x2eb/0x300 [btrfs]
[37079.168375] Code: bd 58 ff ff ff 00 4c 8d (...)
[37079.170199] RSP: 0018:ffffaa53875c7de0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[37079.171120] RAX: ffff98099e701cf8 RBX: ffff98099e2d4000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[37079.172057] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffc0acc5b1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[37079.173002] RBP: ffff98099e701cf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[37079.173886] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff98099e701c00
[37079.174730] R13: ffff98099e2d5100 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100
[37079.175578] FS:  00007f4d7d0a5840(0000) GS:ffff9809ec600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37079.176434] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[37079.177289] CR2: 0000559224dcc000 CR3: 000000012207a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[37079.178152] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37079.178935] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37079.179675] Call Trace:
[37079.180419]  close_ctree+0x291/0x2d1 [btrfs]
[37079.181162]  generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100
[37079.181898]  kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30
[37079.182641]  btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
[37079.183371]  deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70
[37079.184012]  cleanup_mnt+0x100/0x160
[37079.184650]  task_work_run+0x68/0xb0
[37079.185284]  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf9/0x100
[37079.185920]  do_syscall_64+0x20d/0x260
[37079.186556]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
[37079.187197] RIP: 0033:0x7f4d7d2d9357
[37079.187836] Code: eb 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 (...)
[37079.189180] RSP: 002b:00007ffee4e0d368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[37079.189845] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f4d7d3fb224 RCX: 00007f4d7d2d9357
[37079.190515] RDX: ffffffffffffff78 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000559224dc5c90
[37079.191173] RBP: 0000559224dc1970 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffee4e0c0e0
[37079.191815] R10: 0000559224dc7b00 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[37079.192451] R13: 0000559224dc5c90 R14: 0000559224dc1a80 R15: 0000559224dc1ba0
[37079.193096] irq event stamp: 0
[37079.193729] hardirqs last  enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[37079.194379] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff97ab8935>] copy_process+0x755/0x1ea0
[37079.195033] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffff97ab8935>] copy_process+0x755/0x1ea0
[37079.195700] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[37079.196318] ---[ end trace b32710d864dea887 ]---

In the past commit d611add4 ("btrfs: fix reclaim counter leak of
space_info objects") fixed similar cases. That commit however has a date
more recent (April 7 2020) then the commit mentioned before (March 13
2020), however it was merged in kernel 5.7 while the older commit, which
introduces a new leak, was merged only in the 5.8 merge window. So the
leak sneaked in unnoticed.

Fix this by making steal_from_global_rsv() remove the ticket using the
helper remove_ticket(), which decrements the reclaim_size counter of the
space_info object.

Fixes: 7f9fe614 ("btrfs: improve global reserve stealing logic")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Under somewhat convoluted conditions, it is possible to attempt to
release an extent_buffer that is under io, which triggers a BUG_ON in
btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages.

This relies on a few different factors. First, extent_buffer reads done
as readahead for searching use WAIT_NONE, so they free the local extent
buffer reference while the io is outstanding. However, they should still
be protected by TREE_REF. However, if the system is doing signficant
reclaim, and simultaneously heavily accessing the extent_buffers, it is
possible for releasepage to race with two concurrent readahead attempts
in a way that leaves TREE_REF unset when the readahead extent buffer is
released.

Essentially, if two tasks race to allocate a new extent_buffer, but the
winner who attempts the first io is rebuffed by a page being locked
(likely by the reclaim itself) then the loser will still go ahead with
issuing the readahead. The loser's call to find_extent_buffer must also
race with the reclaim task reading the extent_buffer's refcount as 1 in
a way that allows the reclaim to re-clear the TREE_REF checked by
find_extent_buffer.

The following represents an example execution demonstrating the race:

            CPU0                                                         CPU1                                           CPU2
reada_for_search                                            reada_for_search
  readahead_tree_block                                        readahead_tree_block
    find_create_tree_block                                      find_create_tree_block
      alloc_extent_buffer                                         alloc_extent_buffer
                                                                  find_extent_buffer // not found
                                                                  allocates eb
                                                                  lock pages
                                                                  associate pages to eb
                                                                  insert eb into radix tree
                                                                  set TREE_REF, refs == 2
                                                                  unlock pages
                                                              read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE
                                                                not uptodate (brand new eb)
                                                                                                            lock_page
                                                                if !trylock_page
                                                                  goto unlock_exit // not an error
                                                              free_extent_buffer
                                                                release_extent_buffer
                                                                  atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1
        find_extent_buffer // found
                                                                                                            try_release_extent_buffer
                                                                                                              take refs_lock
                                                                                                              reads refs == 1; no io
          atomic_inc_not_zero refs to 2
          mark_buffer_accessed
            check_buffer_tree_ref
              // not STALE, won't take refs_lock
              refs == 2; TREE_REF set // no action
    read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE
                                                                                                              clear TREE_REF
                                                                                                              release_extent_buffer
                                                                                                                atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1
                                                                                                                unlock_page
      still not uptodate (CPU1 read failed on trylock_page)
      locks pages
      set io_pages > 0
      submit io
      return
    free_extent_buffer
      release_extent_buffer
        dec refs to 0
        delete from radix tree
        btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages
          BUG_ON(io_pages > 0)!!!

We observe this at a very low rate in production and were also able to
reproduce it in a test environment by introducing some spurious delays
and by introducing probabilistic trylock_page failures.

To fix it, we apply check_tree_ref at a point where it could not
possibly be unset by a competing task: after io_pages has been
incremented. All the codepaths that clear TREE_REF check for io, so they
would not be able to clear it after this point until the io is done.

Stack trace, for reference:
[1417839.424739] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[1417839.435328] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4841!
[1417839.447024] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[1417839.502972] RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0x20/0x1f0
[1417839.517008] Code: ed e9 ...
[1417839.558895] RSP: 0018:ffffc90020bcf798 EFLAGS: 00010202
[1417839.570816] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888102d6def0 RCX: 0000000000000028
[1417839.586962] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8887f0296482 RDI: ffff888102d6def0
[1417839.603108] RBP: ffff88885664a000 R08: 0000000000000046 R09: 0000000000000238
[1417839.619255] R10: 0000000000000028 R11: ffff88885664af68 R12: 0000000000000000
[1417839.635402] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88875f573ad0 R15: ffff888797aafd90
[1417839.651549] FS:  00007f5a844fa700(0000) GS:ffff88885f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[1417839.669810] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1417839.682887] CR2: 00007f7884541fe0 CR3: 000000049f609002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[1417839.699037] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[1417839.715187] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[1417839.731320] Call Trace:
[1417839.737103]  release_extent_buffer+0x39/0x90
[1417839.746913]  read_block_for_search.isra.38+0x2a3/0x370
[1417839.758645]  btrfs_search_slot+0x260/0x9b0
[1417839.768054]  btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70
[1417839.778427]  btrfs_get_extent+0x15f/0x830
[1417839.787665]  ? submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x1c0
[1417839.797474]  ? __do_readpage+0x299/0x7a0
[1417839.806515]  __do_readpage+0x33b/0x7a0
[1417839.815171]  ? btrfs_releasepage+0x70/0x70
[1417839.824597]  extent_readpages+0x28f/0x400
[1417839.833836]  read_pages+0x6a/0x1c0
[1417839.841729]  ? startup_64+0x2/0x30
[1417839.849624]  __do_page_cache_readahead+0x13c/0x1a0
[1417839.860590]  filemap_fault+0x6c7/0x990
[1417839.869252]  ? xas_load+0x8/0x80
[1417839.876756]  ? xas_find+0x150/0x190
[1417839.884839]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x295/0x3b0
[1417839.894652]  __do_fault+0x32/0x110
[1417839.902540]  __handle_mm_fault+0xacd/0x1000
[1417839.912156]  handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1c0
[1417839.921004]  __do_page_fault+0x242/0x4b0
[1417839.930044]  ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
[1417839.937933]  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[1417839.945631] RIP: 0033:0x33c4bae
[1417839.952927] Code: Bad RIP value.
[1417839.960411] RSP: 002b:00007f5a844f7350 EFLAGS: 00010206
[1417839.972331] RAX: 000000000000006e RBX: 1614b3ff6a50398a RCX: 0000000000000000
[1417839.988477] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002
[1417840.004626] RBP: 00007f5a844f7420 R08: 000000000000006e R09: 00007f5a94aeccb8
[1417840.020784] R10: 00007f5a844f7350 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5a94aecc79
[1417840.036932] R13: 00007f5a94aecc78 R14: 00007f5a94aecc90 R15: 00007f5a94aecc40

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Convert fall through comments to the pseudo-keyword which is now the
preferred way.

Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

The wait_event_... defines evaluate to long so we should not assign it an int as this may truncate
the value.

Reported-by: Marshall Midden <marshallmidden@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

When xfstest generic/035, we found the target file was deleted
if the rename return -EACESS.

In cifs_rename2, we unlink the positive target dentry if rename
failed with EACESS or EEXIST, even if the target dentry is positived
before rename. Then the existing file was deleted.

We should just delete the target file which created during the
rename.

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>