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  1. Dec 03, 2006
  3. Nov 22, 2006
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  9. Nov 01, 2006
  11. Oct 31, 2006
    • James Morris's avatar
      [IPV6]: fix flowlabel seqfile handling · 1b7c2dbc
      James Morris authored 
      

There's a bug in the seqfile show operation for flowlabel objects, where 
each hash chain is traversed cumulatively for each element.  The following 
function is called for each element of each chain:

static void ip6fl_fl_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
{
        while(fl) {
                seq_printf...
		
		fl = fl->next;
	}
}

Thus, objects can appear mutliple times when reading 
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, as the above is called for each element in the 
chain.

The solution is to remove the while() loop from the above, and traverse 
each chain exactly once, per the patch below.  This also removes the 
ip6fl_fl_seq_show() function, which does nothing else.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1b7c2dbc
    • James Morris's avatar
      [IPV6]: return EINVAL for invalid address with flowlabel lease request · c6817e4c
      James Morris authored 
      

Currently, when an application requests a lease for a flowlabel via the 
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR socket option, no error is returned if an invalid type 
of destination address is supplied as part of the request, leading to a 
silent failure.  This patch ensures that EINVAL is returned to the 
application in this case.

Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c6817e4c
  13. Oct 30, 2006
  15. Oct 24, 2006
    • Patrick McHardy's avatar
      [NETFILTER]: Fix ip6_tables extension header bypass bug · 6d381634
      Patrick McHardy authored 
      

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header matches.

When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.

Signed-off-by: default avatarPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6d381634
    • Patrick McHardy's avatar
      [NETFILTER]: Fix ip6_tables protocol bypass bug · 51d8b1a6
      Patrick McHardy authored 
      

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on protocol matches.

When the protocol header doesn't follow the fragment header immediately,
the fragment header contains the protocol number of the next extension
header. When the extension header and the protocol header are sent in
a second fragment a rule like "ip6tables .. -p udp -j DROP" will never
match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.

Signed-off-by: default avatarPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      51d8b1a6
  17. Oct 22, 2006
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  23. Oct 12, 2006